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SALIX V. USFS; WHY CAN’T THE AGENCIES JUST TALK
TO EACH OTHER?
Michelle Tafoya
No. 13-35624
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Oral Argument: Monday, July 7, 2014, 9:00 a.m. in the Portland Pioneer
Courtroom, Portland, Oregon.
Case Panel: PREGERSON, PAEZ, WATFORD
I. ORAL ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Given the complexity and breadth of this case, the summary below
only includes the main oral arguments of Mr. Brabender and Mr. Kenna
and the key questions of Judges Pregerson, Paez, and Watford.1
A. Federal Defendants-Appellants USFS
Within seconds after Mr. Brabender began his argument, Judge Paez
interjected to ask why USFS did not reinitiate consultation when FWS
designated lynx critical habitat. Mr. Brabender claimed that USFS did
not take any affirmative action which required consultation because it did
not promulgate the designation. He then introduced USFS’s main § 7
argument: in this case, the agency is not required to reinitiate
consultation on the Amendment because it is sufficient that consultation
occurs when specific projects are considered. Judge Paez asked if USFS
refers to the broader Amendment when engaged in project level
consultation and whether the Amendment would be stronger if it
included critical habitat. In response, Mr. Brabender equated the
Amendment’s identification of occupied habitat with the ESA’s critical
habitat designation and argued that project consultation would reveal if
the Amendment’s protections were insufficient. When Judge Paez
pointed to ESA regulations, which seem to impose an obligation to
reinitiate consultation in this case, Mr. Brabender claimed the provision
only applies when an agency action occurs and the continued existence
of the forest plan is not action.
Mr. Brabender then argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing in this
case because they failed to show any concrete harm. While Judge Paez
1
Oral Argument Audiofile, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ media/view.php?pk_id=0000013005 (9th Cir. July 7, 2014) (No. 1335624).
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viewed the plaintiffs’ declarations as “pretty carefully drawn,” Judge
Watford asked if the plaintiffs needed to challenge a particular project to
establish injury. Mr. Brabender responded affirmatively, and that the
plaintiffs failed in that respect.
B. Environmental Plaintiff-Appellee CELC
Mr. Kenna attempted to begin his argument on the merits, but he was
quickly redirected by Judge Watson’s clear concern with the standing
issue. He asked why the court shouldn’t require the plaintiffs to establish
injury stemming from a specific project and how they could be impacted
absent the approval of a plan’s particular project. First, Mr. Kenna
responded that the plaintiffs did allege injury from three USFS projects,
which stemmed from the implementation of the Amendment. Mr. Kenna
also argued that case law allows plaintiffs to mount a facial challenge to
a programmatic plan if they demonstrate impacts to them in a specific
place. Further, he argued that just because a plaintiff can bring a site
specific challenge, does not mean they cannot challenge the
programmatic plan instead. Judge Watford asked what injury the
plaintiffs could have possibly suffered if a consultation was completed
for a site specific plan. Mr. Kenna countered that site specific
consultation alone is insufficient, even where cumulative impacts are
considered.
With the prompting of Judge Paez, Mr. Kenna was able to resume
his arguments on the merits. He cited a litany of case law for the
proposition that USFS was required to reinitiate consultation on the
Amendment because the agency retains discretion to protect the lynx
under the ESA. Judge Watford then prompted Mr. Kenna to make his
argument for injunctive relief. Mr. Kenna stated that while there was no
need to show irreparable harm in this case, such harm is presumed from
USFS’s procedural violation because of the ESA’s clear mandate to
protect endangered species. Mr. Kenna also claimed that, absent the
pressure of an injunction, there was no incentive for USFS to reinitiate
consultation on the Amendment.
C. USFS’s Rebuttal Argument
Mr. Brabender’s rebuttal argument was significantly frustrated by
Judge Pregerson’s demands to know why USFS could not just “talk” to
FWS after a significant change in lynx critical habitat designation. While
Mr. Brabender claimed that consultation occurs on specific projects, he
could not say if any occurred in the last year. Judge Pregerson’s
frustration with Mr. Brabender was evident, accusing him of putting up
“smokescreens” and failing to “talk straight.” In the last few minutes of
his time, Mr. Brabender was able to argue against injunctive relief,
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stating that the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm. However,
Judge Paez contended that it wouldn’t “take much” for the plaintiffs to
show such harm when an endangered species is involved.
II. ANALYSIS
Toward the end of Mr. Kenna’s argument, Judge Pregerson asked
him “where the shining path is to help you get where you want to go.”
This statement seems indicative of the general support for CELC’s
arguments on the merits, at least by the majority of the court. While Mr.
Kenna sailed smoothly through his § 7 argument, Judge Paez and Judge
Pregerson besieged Mr. Brabender with questions and challenges.
While CELC’s biggest challenge seems to be Judge Watford’s
reluctance to accept their standing argument, the plaintiffs will likely
survive the threshold challenge to standing. Near the end of his long
exchange with Mr. Kenna on the issue, Judge Watford said he was still
“stuck” on the idea that injury had to stem from a specific project.
However, neither Judge Paez nor Judge Pregerson seemed to join Judge
Watford in his concern.
The majority of the court also seemed receptive to Mr. Kenna’s
argument for injunctive relief. While Judge Paez briefly asked about the
presence of irreparable harm, he focused more on the timber projects
involved and how the injunction would work overall. Additionally, Judge
Pregerson seemed convinced that USFS would not act to reinitiate
consultation without an injunction. Thus, if the plaintiffs win on their
standing and § 7 arguments, there is a real possibility that an injunction
will be granted.
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